Abstract. Quantum cryptography is one example of applying a deep understanding of quantum physics to create a novel technology of potentially enormous significance. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography. Crépeau showed the first quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer in 1994 based on the transmission of polarized light and the exist of secure quantum bit commitment protocol. The protocol he constructed satisfy both the correctness and the privacy for Alice with probability 1 − ε n , the privacy for Bob with probability 1 2 . In this paper, we show that quantum can be constructed using only the Bell states, and the scheme satisfies the correctness and the privacy for Alice with probability 1, the privacy for Bob with probability . Finally, We show that quantum bit commitment and quantum coin flipping can be constructed using QOT.
Introduction

Background
Quantum cryptography is one example of applying a deep understanding of quantum physics to create a novel technology of potentially enormous significance. Quantum cryptography currently has only two aspects, both mostly theoretical. The first is quantum key exchange [6, 7] , the second is the effect of quantum computing on cryptanalysis [19] .
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography.
OT was first put forward by Rabin [18] . In 1985, Even, Goldreich and Lempel provided another similar cryptographic tool named 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [9] using any public key cryptosystem. In 1989, Bellare and Micali show how to implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer without interaction [16] , through the medium of a public file.
Informally speaking in an oblivious Transfer, Alice sends a bit to Bob that he receives half the time (this fact is out of their control), Alice does not find out what happened, Bob knows if he got the bit or nothing. Similarly, in a one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, Alice has two bits b 0 , b 1 that she sends to Bob in such a way that he can decide to get either of them at his choosing but not both. Alice never finds out which bit Bob received.
There are two kinds of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, one is named bit oblivious transfer, and the other is named string oblivious transfer, i.e. the difference between the two OTs is that Alice sends two bits or two strings to Bob. In 2000, Stefan Wolf showed that 1-out-of-2 string oblivious can be reduced to 1-out-of-2 bit oblivious transfer [20] .
A more general oblivious transfer is 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. In the scheme, Bob can get only one from the n messages sent from Alice. In 1996, Brassard, Crepeau and Santha showed that 1-out-of-n oblivious transfers could be constructed by intersecting codes [10] . In 1999, Naor and Pinkas provided a 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer with adaptive queries [13] .
m-out-of-n (1 ≤ m < n) oblivious transfer is the most general one. m-out-of-n oblivious transfer can be constructed by 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer m time [13] . However, it can be constructed more efficiently. In, 2002, Mu, Zhang, and Varadharajan showed that m-out-of-n oblivious transfer can be constructed based on discrete logarithm [22] .
In 1994, Claude Crépeau provided a quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [5] (QOT) based on the transmission of polarized light and the exist of secure quantum bit commitment protocol [3] . He proved that if both of the two party follow the protocol, then Bob can get the one and only one bit except with a negligeable number ε n . However, Mayor showed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible [12] .
Results and Organization
In this paper, we construct a quantum 1-out-of-2 bit oblivious transfer (Bit-QOT 1 2 ) based only on the Bell States. Bob can get one and only one bit with probability 1. Alice can only decides which bit Bob with probability 1 2 . Furthermore, we construct quantum 1-out-of-2 string oblivious transfer (String-QOT 1 2 ), quantum 1-out-of-n string oblivious transfer (String-QOT 1 n ), quantum m-out-of-n string oblivious transfer (String-QOT m n , 1 ≤ m < n) based on the Bit-QOT 1 2 , so we have the corollary that String-QOT m n and Bit-QOT m n can be constructed using Bit-QOT 1 2 . In section 2, we give the definitions of the QOTs. In section 3, we construct a 1-out-of-2 QOT based on the Bell states and proof that is satisfy the definition. In section 4, We show the relation between the QOTs, which implies that QOT m n can be constructed using only QOT 1 2 . Finilly, we provide some further works related to the QOT.
Definition
In this section, we formally describe the definitions of QOTs. Let B 1 be the information that Alice can get from Bob, A 2 be the information that Bob can get from Alice. A 1 be the output of Alice in the scheme, B 2 be the output of Bob in the scheme. 
In the definition, the first point means that
i.e. Alice cannot decide which message Bob can get from the two messages {m 0 , m 1 }. The second point means that Bob can get only one message from the two messages {m 0 , m 1 } but not both.
Definition 2.2 (Quantum m-out-of-n Oblivious-Transfer (QOT
wants to send to B. We say that QOT m n is m-out-of-n oblivious-transfer if
In the definition, the first point means that Alice cannot decide which m messages can Bob get. The second point means that Bob can get only m messages from the n messages sent from Alice.
3 Bit-QOT 
Based on Bell States
Here we present a Bit-QOT 1 2 scheme based on the Bell states. The scheme makes use of some interesting properties of the Bell states and it could be easier to implement in the lab. It relies on the Bell states:
and the four Pauli matrices
If the Bob wants to know b 1 , he builds the following 3-qubit state
and if he wants to know b 2 he builds
Bob keeps the first qubit to himself, sends the second qubit and the third qubit to Alice. It is easy to see that Alice always gets a completely mixed qubit, so she learn nothing about c(c = 1 or c = 2). When Alice gets the qubits, she applies σ b 1 b 2 to the second and the third qubits. It is easy to verify:
That is, Alice will applies a phase flip if b 1 = 1 and a bit flip if b 2 = 1. So if Bob wants to know b 1 , the qubits become
and if Bob wants to know b 2 , the qubits become
Alice measures the third qubit and announces the result to Bob. So 1. If c = 1 and the result be |0 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
2. if c = 1 and the result be |1 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
3. If c = 2 and the result be |0 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
4. if c = 1 and the result be |1 , the remanent qubits |ϕ 3 would be
From the 4 cases, we find that if c=2, the remanent qubits is pure states, while if c=1, the remanent qubits is entanglement state. Alice applies the Hadamard transform to the second qubit , which maps
Then the first and the second qubits become |ϕ 4 So the first qubit would not become |0 or |1
after the measurement the second qubit. Alice measures the second qubit and announces the result to Bob, which leave one qubit |ϕ 5 .
After measurement the second qubit and the third qubit, Bob get the first qubit without any entanglemant, He applies the applies Hadamard transform to the first qubit and gets |ϕ 6 , which maps 1
Bob measures the first qubit and get |b c with probability 1 according to the table 1 and table 2 . We present the Bit-QOT 1 2 in the following. 1 or table 2 Correctness : If Bob follows the scheme, he will get b c he wanted.
Privacy : As Alice always gets completely mixed qubits, so she learn nothing about c. If Bob follows the scheme, the qubit that return from Alice relates to only one of b 1 and b 2 , so he can not get more than one of b 1 and b 2 .
If Bob does not follow the scheme, he construct the following qubits +b 00 |B 00 + (−1)
After the measurement of the second qubit and the third qubit, we can find Bob have a qubit likes α|0 + (−1) xb 1 +yb 2 β|1 α, β ∈ C, x, y ∈ Z, whice satisfies
Then, we suppose that Bob can work out xb 1 + yb 2 . However, he can not figure out both b 1 and b 2 using only xb 1 + yb 2 . So we have the conclusion that Bob can get only one of b 1 and b 2 .
Relations between the QOTs
In this section, we will show the relations between the QOTs, we will use the Bit-QOT 1 2 as a sub protocol, construct other QOTs, the relations between them are showed in the following: The messages in the QOT scheme can be bits or strings. In this section we show that String-QOT 1 2 can be constructed using an Bit-QOT 1 2 as sub protocol, and vice versa.
Construct String-QOT
In the String-QOT 1 2 , Bob has input c, Alice has input strings s 0 and s 1 , each of them consist of k bits:
For any i(1 ≤ i ≤ k), Alice and Bob run the Bit-QOT 1 2 with the input b 0k , b 1k and c. So 
•
String-QOT-output=String-QOT-output+Bit-QOT-output 3. Bob output String-QOT-output 4. Halt
The probability in the String-QOT 1 2 we construct is
So, String-QOT 1 2 can be constructed using Bit-QOT 1 2 .
Construct Bit-QOT
In the Bit-QOT 1 2 , Alice has input bits b 0 and b 1 , Bob has input c. Alice construct two strings s 0 and s 1 .
Alice and Bob run the protocol String-QOT 1 2 (s 0 , s 1 )(c), the probability satisfied 
Halt
The probability of the Bit-QOT we construct is
So Bit-QOT 1 2 can be constructed using String-QOT 1 2 . In 1999, Naor and Pinkas showed that 1-out-of-n QOT can be constructed using 1-out-of-2
Relation between the String-QOT
QOT based on the pseudo-random function [14] . We will show that 1-out-of-n QOT can be constructed solely by 1-out-of-2 QOT. We have
Construct String-QOT
We first construct QOT 1 n using QOT 1 2 , A have n messages m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n , M = {m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n }. Alice extends the n message to N = 2
Halt
Then we have the String-QOT 1 N scheme
then we get an 1-out-of-N String-QOT. It is easy to check that
Run the QOT(1, n) m times, we get an QOT m n scheme.
Form the above constructing, we can check
So QOT m n can be constructed using QOT 1 2 .
Construct
String-QOT 1 2 using String-QOT m n We have
In the QOT 1 2 protocol we want to construct, let m 1 2 , m 2 2 be the messages that Alice want to send to Bob. Alice can construct m 1 2 and m 2 2 by: 
Alice and Bob run String-QOT
1 n (m 1 ⊕ m 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ m n )(c)
Halt
So, we have the following probability 
Application
Bit Commitment
In bit commitment, Bob enters a bit b. At a later time, Aliceamy request this bit and, whenever he does, he receives this bit, otherwise he learns nothing about b. In 1993, Brassard, etc presented a quantum bit commitment [3] based on the BB84. In 1995, Mayers showed that this kind of bit commitment is impossible [12] . It doesn't mean that any quantum bit commitment is impossible. We show that secure quantum bit commitment can be achieve using the quantum oblivious transfer we constructe in the above. We give a Quantum bit commitment scheme in the following, it consistes of two sub protocols, commit and unveil: and #{b c i = 1|i = 1, · · · , m} < m 4 . In the work of Mayers [12] , Bob can convince Alice b = 0 or b = 1 by a quantum transformation. In our scheme, we make use of the merit of both quantum and classical theory. Bob have only classical bit b other than quantum bit at the beginning of unveiling. So, Bob can no cheat Alice during the scheme.
Coins Tossing
In many cryptographic protocols, there is a need for random bits that are common to both parties. However, if one of parties is allowed to generate these random bits, this party may have a chance to finfluence the outcome of the protocol by appropriately picking the random bits [11] .
In the case of quantum, people try to find more secure scheme [6, 17, 23, 1] . In 2001, Ambainis constructed a quantum coin flipping protocol. In this part, we construct a quantum coin flpping using the QOT. 
Conclusion and Further works
The construction in this paper shows the potential of quantum cryptography. The oblivious transfer we constructed can be realized using the quantum communication and some simple quantum operation. In the end, two of the following points may be instresting for further works:
1. The physical realization of the QOT schemes.
2. The relation between the QOT and the other quantum cryptography scheme besides coins tossing, bit commitment.
